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Donald Shoup is a professor of urban planning at the University of California, Los 
Angeles.  He holds a doctorate in economics from Yale, and has spent several decades 
researching parking.  He has long been known within transportation and planning fields as the 
authority on parking.  Now he has poured his learning into a massive book.   
The book persuades me that the impact of parking polices is much greater than I 
thought.  Fundamentally, the policies in question are just two: city governments (1) 
mismanage curb parking and (2) require developers to provide extensive off-street parking. 
Pesky policy-wonkery?  Shoup shows that the magnitudes are huge.  About 87 percent 
of all trips in the U.S. are made by personal motor vehicles, and parking is free for 99 percent 
of these trips (p. 590).  But free parking is not a spontaneous outcome.  The required parking 
lot at a restaurant usually occupies at least three times as much land as the restaurant itself.   
Shoup reckons this a subsidy to parking, and estimates the U.S. total of such subsidy between 
$127 billion and $374 billion a year.  “If we also count the subsidy for free and underpriced 
curb parking, the total subsidy for parking would be far higher.  . . .  Do we really want to 
spend as much to subsidize parking as we spend for Medicare or national defense?” (591)   
Like freeways and free schooling, free parking isn’t free.  “We don’t pay for parking in 
our role as motorists, but in all our other roles—as consumers, investors, workers, residents, 
and taxpayers—we pay a high price” (2).  Meanwhile, when motorists drive downtown and 
cannot find a parking spot, they curse and increase congestion.  Exactly like on freeways. 
The extent of free parking is so enormous and so normal that people just think it nature’s 
endowment, like air.  Everyone feels entitled to free air and free parking.  Hence, “most 
people do not see it as being any subsidy at all” (591).  “Because parking costs so much and 
motorists pay so little for it, the hidden subsidy is truly gigantic” (591). 
And yet scholars hardly notice parking at all.  Shoup surveys various leading textbooks 
and sources, and concludes: “Somehow, the urban land use with the biggest footprint and a 
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(25).   
Parking requirements “increase traffic congestion and air pollution, distort urban form, 
degrade urban design, increase housing costs, limit homeownership, damage the urban 
economy, harm the central business district, and penalize poor families” (592).  Mandated on-
site parking “skews travel choices toward cars and away from public transit, cycling, and 
walking” (2-3). 
The book is marvelous and wonderful.  It explains that parking policy is stuck in a self-
feeding cycle.  It brilliantly criticizes the culture of parking policymakers.  It tells all facets of 
the history.  It provides theoretical underpinnings.  It displays rich empirical evidence.  It 
makes novel connections and illuminates old issues.  It bubbles with illustrations, cultural 
allusions, and ripe quotations.  And its 734 pages are gracefully written.  It is one of the best 
policy books I know.  The book represents a life-work in understanding the problem and 
enlightening the public. 
 
Spontaneous Order Forsaken 
The main thrust of Shoup’s analysis is that parking should be left to the invisible hand.  
He wants to remove zoning requirements for off-street parking.  As for the street, he does not 
propose full-fledged privatization, but something in that direction.  The government should 
create local districts that receive the revenue of paid street parking and use the revenue for 
district improvements.  Thus, Shoup advocates a radically decentralized form of governmental 
control and residual claimancy.  The virtues he describes are precisely the virtues of private 
ownership.  Why not just privatize?  More on that later.   
Shoup explains that parking requirements are “a disastrous substitute for million of 
individual decisions—by developers, merchants, employers, and drivers—about how much a 
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order:   
•  “Parking will increasingly become unbundled from other transactions, and 
professional operators will manage more of the parking supply” (496).  
•  “Emancipation from parking requirements will especially encourage 
adaptive reuse and infill development in older areas where providing more 
parking is difficult and will also favor development at locations with good 
public transit” (498). 
•  “If cities charge market prices for curb parking, drivers will usually be able 
to find an available space near their destination” (14-15). 
•  “To solve the curb parking commons problems without imposing inept land-




Perhaps the surest way to know if parking requirements are distorting the decisions of 
developers is to consult revealed preference:  Do developers often decide to build more than 
the minimum?  Studies show that they rarely do.  Moreover, Shoup tells of his own 
experience on the Design Review Board on the Los Angeles City Planning Department: “I 
reviewed the plans of all development in Westwood between 1994 and 2003.  I saw many 
projects where the parking requirements limited the floor space of a building, prevented 
changing its use, or disfigured its design.  But I never saw a project with significantly more 
parking than the zoning requires” (90). 
Most of the time you go to the shopping mall or supermarket, there is a superabundance 
of empty spaces.  It may not seem this way, because you focus on the area near to the 
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cities, finding “that the peak parking occupancy averaged only 56 percent of capacity” (82).  
Investigate the top floor of office-park parking structures: Not only are there no cars, there are 
few oil spots. 
Parking requirements do not require that parking be free.  The regulatee may charge for 
parking.  However, Shoup reports the results of Urban Land Institute’s 1999 survey of 
shopping centers: “Only 2 percent of the centers charged for parking, and they validated it for 
customers.  Only 1 percent charged employees for parking.”  Free parking is a matter of 
supply and demand: “if there are more than enough spaces to satisfy the peak demand at a 
zero price, why charge for them?” (p.87) 
 
The Intervention Dynamic 
At the heart of the parking mess is an intervention dynamic.  Motorists park on the street 
and fill the spaces.  Tight parking is a great aggravation, so when people hear that a new 
building is planned, they fear even greater aggravation—an “externality.”  But a large part of 
the aggravation arises from open access at the curb, as well as failure to use better technology.  
Parking requirements then seem like a reasonable imposition.  “Planners set off-street parking 
requirements because the government fails to charge fair-market prices for curb parking, not 
because the market fails to provide enough off-street parking” (498). 
Then the situation is misconstrued:  “Planners have identified the source of the problem 
not as the city’s failure to charge market prices for curb parking, but as the market’s failure to 
supply enough off-street parking” (p. 8).  By setting parking requirements, they save us from 
the vagaries of the marketplace.  But less beneficent souls also find parking requirements 
useful.  For example, the opponents of a large development usually invoke parking 
requirements as a reason to reject it or scale it back (495). 
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Quack Professional Culture 
Shoup explores how planners set requirements.  Mainly, they copy each other.  “[T]wo 
surveys suggest that planners set requirements close to the average of other cities” (31).  No 
matter how defective, professional standards become self-validating. 
The other method is to consult the manuals of the Institute of Transportation Engineers 
(ITE), which produces Parking Generation and Trip Generation. These authorities estimate 
“demand” as peak utilization.  Price is not a variable.  “The maximum observed demand thus 
becomes the minimum required supply” (24).  Shoup explores the ITE in depth and makes 
clear its quackish nature, and yet their numbers constitute the professional convention.  “As a 
result, Parking Generation directly governs many of the cities’ parking requirements” (53). 
The presupposition of free parking becomes self-fulfilling:  “[U]rban planners who use 
these parking generation rates to set minimum parking requirements are shaping a city where 
almost everyone will drive wherever they go and park free when they get there” (32). 
The amount of parking generated by a site depends on many variables (including price 
of parking), so it is hard to predict or control.  Moreover, if the planners tried to fine tune the 
requirement, the developer will simply provide misleading information and projections.  “To 
avoid these problems cities usually require parking in proportion to something known when a 
building permit is granted, is difficult to change without another permit, and can be measured 
easily to verify compliance.  For this reason, cities usually require parking in proportion to the 
built floor space at a site, even if this is a poor prediction of parking demand” (78). 
The foolish practices are cemented in by legal considerations.  “Admitting the flimsy 
basis of the parking and trip generation rates would expose land-use decisions to countless 
lawsuits from developers, neighborhood groups, and property-rights advocates, all of whom 
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and could argue for either more or less parking” (53). 
Shoup’s analysis of the professional culture is powerful, though always rounded at the 
tip.  Consider this bit of language analysis: 
 
Even the phrase ‘set a parking requirement’ is humbug.  The word ‘set’ suggests 
the possession of special expertise or technical ability to calibrate a finely tuned 
instrument.  But urban planners have no special expertise or technical ability to 
predict parking demand, and parking requirements are not finely tuned 
instruments.  Planning for parking is a skill learned on the job, and it is more a 
political than a professional activity.  Perhaps planners merely ‘impose’ parking 
requirements. (88) 
 
Shoup is on the edge of saying that parking requirements are vanity plus coercive power.  He 
notes that “parking requirements result from democratic decision making” (22), and that 
“[u]rban planners who establish off-street parking requirements . . . have no financial 
incentive to get things right” (497).   
 
Technology Neglected 
Technology is an important part of the story.  Before the days of electronic technologies, 
paying for curb parking involved unsightly parking metering and the handling of coins.  But 
with new devices the motorist need not have coins, need not pay for unused minutes, and need 
not confront the spectacle of metering posts.  One type is the multispace pay-and-display 
meter—you display the printed permit after paying for a selected number of minutes.  Another 
is the multispace “pay-by-space” meter, which eliminates “meter anxiety” (that is, worrying 
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the in-vehicle parking meter.  The meter ticks away visibly inside the vehicle as the vehicle 
sits in the rented parking space.  It is like paying for long-distance telephone calls with a 
prepaid calling card.  These developments are not pie-in-the-sky, but rather tangible off-the-
shelf technologies.  The in-vehicle system is successfully used in Aspen, Colorado and other 
U.S. cities.  Shoup tells of coming developments using satellite technology, Global 
Positioning, and payment by mobile phone.  Just as electronic toll technology eradicates any 
argument for freeways, electronic metering technologies undermine arguments for free curb 
parking.  The government’s mismanagement of curb parking, then, amounts not merely to not 
charging for it, but to a more general failure to keep current with technology.   
Awareness of the new technologies helps one to envision how parking will work in 
Shoup’s proposed arrangement. 
 
The Parking Benefit District 
Again, the core of Shoup’s reform package is (1) the removal of parking requirements 
and (2) the semi-propertization of curbside parking capacity as a resource of the newly 
created “parking benefit district” (PBD).  Shoup’s arguments for propertization are superb.  
He writes that the rents “need the right recipients who will demand price reforms, and these 
right recipients are those for whom the benefits of efficient management are concentrated 
rather than dispersed” (528).  Parking benefit districts, he says, “provide an excellent example 
of how a neighborhood can capture the economic and social benefits from cooperative use of 
a scarce urban resource” (598).  Shoup envisions the PBD not only being the residual 
claimant, but also the authority over parking decisions: “Shifting the decisions about parking 
to the neighborhood level will thus create the great advantage of a superior interest in the 
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results every day” (598-99). 
Shoup makes a strong case that PBD propertization will improve resource management.  
But the reform strategy has a second important advantage, and that is as a political strategy:  
“Unless the revenue benefits a group who can insist drivers should pay market prices for curb 
parking, the politics of parking will not change . . . [R]eturning revenue to the metered 
neighborhoods will create a countervailing interest and incite a passion to charge for parking” 
(522).  “Parking benefit districts create place-based voting blocs of residents who want 
revenue to improve their neighborhoods” (525). 
 
“Not Privatization” 
The issue, says Shoup, is not government property versus private property.  Rather, the 
issue is open access versus enclosure.   “With curb parking, public property is not the 
problem, and private ownership is not the solution” (596).  “[T]he enclosure of curb parking 
does not imply private ownership of the curb space.  Rather, I am using the term ‘enclosure’ 
to mean charging market prices for curb parking and then spending the resulting revenue for 
local public improvements” (595).   
He insists that “[c]ity life requires common ownership of much land (such as streets, 
sidewalks, and parks)” (7), but all of his reasoning and argumentation would seem to favor 
more thoroughgoing privatization.  Why not fuse residual claimancy with decisive authority 
more completely?  Why not allow divestiture and recombination in ways more flexible than in 
the PBD plan?  For example, suppose reforms held that along designated government streets 
the property owners obtained transferable prescriptive rights to the curb parking capacity 
along the abutting curb.  Property owners could then combine to set up associations to 
manage the resources, or, even better, sell the rights to entrepreneurs who would own the 
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better fusion of residual claimancy and authority, better utilization of local knowledge, and 
ongoing marketization of the resources.  This system, if we could get there, would be less 
politicized than the PBD plan, which might create the sort of perpetual democratic 
fecklessness typical of homeowners’ associations.  Shoup never makes arguments against 
more radical privatization of prescriptive rights, nor against the outright privatization of the 
street.  He references Fred Foldvary’s classic work on private community (Public Goods and 
Private Communities: The Market Provision of Social Services, Aldershot, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 1994) and surely is aware of such theories.   
Also, it seems to me that technological developments might recommend a different 
reform strategy.  It seems like in-vehicle meters could be easily adapted such that the driver 
punches in a parking-merchant code, which is then displayed by the meter.  This system could 
operate nationwide among anyone who wanted to participate.  Call it the Acme system.  For 
example, if you wanted to rent out space in your own personal driveway as parking space, you 
simply put up a sign announcing the rates and saying that the customer must have an Acme-
system meter and punch in the merchant code (provide by the sign).  You then monitor parked 
vehicles for compliance.  A car without an in-vehicle meter, or with the wrong merchant code, 
or perhaps with the wrong rate code displayed would be a trespasser, and could be booted or 
otherwise held to account.  You then collect your payments from the Acme system, who, like 
American Express, takes a cut.  With such an Acme system, we will easily be able to imagine 
a reform movement in favor of capturing the potential revenues of parking supply. 
 
Esoteric Writing and Bargaining 
Leo Strauss famously developed theories of esoteric writing, whereby authors put much 
of what they have to say between the lines, or in various beards and disguises.  They write this 
  10way for strategic reasons specific to the discourse situation, such as placating censors or 
gatekeepers.  It is tempting to read parts of Shoup’s book that way.  Shoup’s book is 
admirable not merely in its wisdom and learning, but in its success in discourse where such 
wisdom and learning is most crucial.  The book is published by the American Planning 
Association.  Imagine if Ludwig von Mises’s 1922 work Socialism (trans. J. Kahane, 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981) had been published by the Soviet Politburo.  That would 
have made the book and the author even greater.  But what if such achievement requires some 
fudging?  Surely favor some fudging to advance enlightenment where it is of great 
consequence.   
Shoup says time and again that his proposal preserves public property, but all of his 
argumentation makes a case for private property.  He often quotes others who point to private 
property, and remains silent about why not to privatizate (594-600).  Likewise, some stinging 
criticisms of government come by way of quotation (e.g., 483). 
Shoup is bargaining with planners, and must be careful not to insult them or impugn 
their motives.  “[M]ost planners who implement off-street parking requirements are public-
minded people trying to do what is best for their communities” (596).  Although he points out 
the greed of construction companies and others in rigging forecasts (61), he absolves 
planners: “does the systematic upward bias in the estimated parking and trip generation rates 
stem from any economic interest in the results? I think the answer is definitely no. . . . 
Mistakes are not being made to advance anyone’s private interest” (62).  For planners, it is a 
case of honest error.   
One must read Shoup’s book through strategic lenses.  Strategic considerations may 
help us understand the sheer size of work.  The comprehensive nature of the work makes it 
impossible to ignore or overlook.  Anyone who pretends to be a scholar or professional 
working on parking policy will simply have to contend with Shoup’s book.  Shoup packs it 
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that reform can be introduced gradually (495), and that cities and planners should regulate 
parking quality but without really making a case for doing so (101ff, 602). 
 
Other Strategic Sacrifices 
Shoup’s strategic writing involves sacrifice.  Where Shoup uses spontaneous-order 
insights—that is, the importance of particularism, local knowledge, ownership, freedom, 
entrepreneurship, incentives, and market forces—he writes only of how these principles 
narrowly relate to parking.  He eschews the connection to the broader body of spontaneous-
order learning.  This strategy might be to the good.  Had he developed his book in the more 
scientific way—Here are principles and now I will apply them to parking—the planners 
would have been embarrassed and unfriendly.  Still, one might regret the failure to connect 
directly and openly to the great train of liberal social theory. 
Second, Shoup’s parking analysis eschews not only invisible-hand theory, but also the 
application of the insights that illuminate parking to issues directly related to parking.  Shoup 
does apply the insights to one related issue, highway congestion, and makes the case for 
tolling highway usage and remitting the revenue to local highway benefit districts.  However, 
Shoup completely neglects the application of spontaneous-order principles to the issue of 
transit, including buses, shuttle vans, jitneys, taxis, and on-the-spot carpools.  This omission is 
significant for two reasons.  First, because the same set of principles apply so 
straightforwardly.  Shoup explains that “[e]very transport system has three elements: vehicles, 
rights-of-way, and terminal capacity” (9).  For the personal motor vehicle system, he analyzes 
the breakdown in terminal capacity—parking.  Likewise, urban route-based transit (buses, 
jitneys, vans) fails miserably because of the same breakdown in the terminal capacity of that 
system, namely the bus stops, bus stations, and pick-up areas, which are generally 
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Moore and Binyam Reja, Curb Rights: A Foundation for Free Enterprise in Urban Transit. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1997).  Moreover, in transit, restrictions on private 
freedom play a big role (just as parking requirements do in Shoup’s story), namely the 
governmental barriers to entry and restrictions on operation in the would-be private bus, van, 
jitney, taxi, and carpool markets.  These transit policy issues are not just theoretical parallels 
to Shoup’s parking analysis, but are important to Shoup’s vision.  Shoup’s reforms will lead 
to more paid parking.  Treating parking space as a scarce resource will mean an outward shift 
in the demand for transportation modes that do not necessitate that you park at your 
destination, notably buses, vans, taxis, etc.  But this new demand cannot be well serviced if 
those services are tightly bound—as they are now—by government restrictions.  Although 
Shoup notes repeatedly that better parking policy would increase transit usage, he never 
address the inadequacy of transit services and the need for parallel reforms there.  Besides the 
transit application, one might argue that there are other parallel applications important to 
Shoup’s vision, such as the property-rights approach to automobile emissions made possible 
by remote sensing.  These omissions, again, are due not to a lack of insight, but to strategic 
considerations.  Shoup is picking his battles.  If the book called for decontrol and property 
rights, not just in parking, but across the range of transportation policy, then it clearly would 
be a libertarian book and hence less effective with the planners, engineers, academics, 
bureaucrats, politicians, and environmentalists.   
A final aspect that might be read as a strategic sacrifice is the appeals to the ideological 
sensibilities of the planners et al.  Characterizing the current parking policies as subsidies to 
the private automobile, he often appeals to the anti-automobile frame of mind.  He writes how 
parking subsidies degrade the environment, increase global warming, increase energy 
consumption, create suburban sprawl, reduce the usage of public transit, reduce walking and 
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cycling, and so on.  He is probably mostly right in all this, but the flavor of it sometimes 
comes across as too tender toward those hostile to the dominance of automobility and 
dispersed development.  Shoup never lets on that automobile dominance is quite ineluctable 
and for good reasons, and that in many respects  his policies would actually make driving 
more attractive relative to other travel modes.   
I tend to see the various shortcomings as strategic sacrifices, and hence not as flaws.  
They are necessary to the book’s great achievements, and hence are redeemed. 
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